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1 
THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF FOLK 
EPISTEMOLOGY 
 
Abstract  
 
Because reasoning allows us to justify our beliefs and evaluate these 
justifications it is central to folk epistemology. Following Sperber, and con-
trary to classical views, it will be argued that reasoning evolved not to com-
plement individual cognition but as an argumentative device. This hypothe-
sis is more consistent with the prevalence of the confirmation and discon-
firmation biases. It will be suggested that these biases render the individual 
use of reasoning hazardous, but that when reasoning is used in its natural, 
argumentative, context they can represent a smart way to divide labor with-
out loosing epistemic value.  
1 Introduction 
Folk epistemology involves a set of cognitive mechanisms that allows us to 
evaluate beliefs, inferences, utterances or other products of the mind. Some 
of these abilities are clearly social in nature. For instance, we routinely eva-
luate the competence and benevolence of the people we interact with 
(Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007), and we use this information in order to ac-
cept – or reject – what they tell us (see Petty & Wegener, 1 998, for adults 
and Koenig & Harris, 2005, for children). Reasoning also plays a crucial 
role in folk epistemology, by understanding and weighing arguments that 
are offered to us in support of a given conclusion, thereby allowing us to 
decide whether we should accept this conclusion or not. This function of 
reasoning, however, is usually overshadowed by the benefits it purportedly 
offers to individual cognition, so well described by Descartes: “The long 
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chains of simple and easy reasonings by means of which geometers are ac-
customed to reach the conclusions of their most difficult demonstrations, 
had led me to imagine that all things, to the knowledge of which man is 
competent, are mutually connected in the same way, and that there is noth-
ing so far removed from us as to be beyond our reach, or so hidden that we 
cannot discover it, provided only we abstain from accepting the false for the 
true, and always preserve in our thoughts the order necessary for the deduc-
tion of one truth from another”. In the recent literature, dual process models 
of reasoning claim that analytic reasoning evolved in order to allow us to 
follow normative guidelines and thus correct the mistakes made by our 
more sloppy intuitive1 mechanisms (see, e.g. Evans & Over, 1996). Con-
trary to this claim, Sperber has proposed that reasoning evolved for argu-
mentative purposes: so that we can convince others and evaluate their ar-
guments when they try to convince us (Mercier & Sperber, 2009; Sperber, 
2000, 2001, see also Dessalles, 2007). In this paper, we will offer a some-
what more precise evolutionary story, provide some support for it and look 
at some implications regarding the effects and efficiency of reasoning.  
2 Classical explanations for the evolution of reasoning 
It has now become fashionable to at least hint at an evolutionary rationale 
for the mental abilities one is studying. In the field of reasoning, some do so 
with reluctance – considering that evolutionary stories are mostly post-hoc 
and of no great explanatory value (Evans, 2006) – while others stress the 
importance of evolutionary thinking and even find in it the inspiration for 
their theories (Stanovich, 2004). Before we start reviewing what the differ-
ent theories of reasoning have to say about its evolution, we must make a 
semantic point. Nowadays, the most influential theories of reasoning are 
couched in terms of dual process: they claim that we have two kinds of 
reasoning mechanisms. The first system is variously known as associative, 
experiential, heuristic or, more simply, system 1. It is thought to be implicit 
(or unconscious), automatic, fast, and prone to mistakes. The second system 
– analytic or system 2 – would be based on rules allowing us to follow 
normative guidelines and correct the wanderings of system 1. For instance, 
in a classical – and therefore tricky – task of reasoning and decision mak-
ing, such as the Linda problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983), the Wason 
selection task (Wason, 1966) or the bat and ball (Frederick, 2005), people 
                                                          
1 What is called here, following Sperber, intuitive mechanisms is also known as system 1 
processes, or heuristic system. I prefer the term intuitive because: (i) it is more explicit than 
‘system 1’, (ii) reasoning also has a very heuristic nature (in fact more so than most intuitive 
processes) and, (iii) it corresponds quite well with the naïve notion of intuition – something we 
feel is right without knowing the reasons. 
often experience a conflict between an intuitive (but wrong) answer sug-
gested by system 1 and the normative answer that the system 2 came up 
with or accepted. It can be argued however that using the term ‘reasoning’ 
to describe system 1 processes is somewhat misleading. These processes are 
mostly unconscious and involve more a sense of ‘intuition’ (see Hammond, 
1996). They are responsible for the first, immediate impression you have of 
a person for instance. This hardly corresponds to the everyday use of ‘rea-
soning’, which typically involves concentration and awareness. We will 
therefore use the word ‘reasoning’ to refer to system 2 reasoning only, and 
we will use ‘intuitive inferences’ for system 1 processes (see Sperber, 
1997).  
A more detailed account – and criticism – of the evolutionary argu-
ments advocated in dual process theories can be found in Mercier and 
Sperber (2009), so we will keep it extremely short here. Steven Sloman 
made two suggestions regarding the function of reasoning (Sloman, 1996). 
It could either complement the rest of cognition by allowing the focus on 
relevant features of a given object, or it could help repress impulses and 
delay gratification. These abilities however are quite widespread in the an-
imal kingdom and it is hard to see how they could predict the specific fea-
tures of reasoning. Evans and Over suggested that reasoning evolved in 
order to “deal with novelty and anticipate the future” (Evans & Over, 1996, 
p.154). Again, all animals have to some extent to deal with novelty and 
anticipate the future. This would be the more general function of learning 
and (prospective) memory, allowing us to draw lessons from the past in 
order to behave more appropriately in the future. But it is Stanovich who 
offers the most in depth evolutionary account. Specifically, he states that 
reasoning is “where the genes gave up direct control and instead said (me-
taphorically, by the types of phenotypic effect that they created) ‘things will 
be changing too fast out there, brain, for us to tell you exactly what to do – 
you just go ahead and do what you think is best given the general goals 
(survival, sexual reproduction) that we have inserted.’” (Stanovich, 2004). 
For him, intuitive inferences are given by genes in the form of rules such as 
‘when in context Y, do A’; such rules favor the genes over the individual. 
Reasoning allows us to inhibit these processes and decontextualize our 
thinking, thus granting us more flexibility and delivering us from the grasp 
of our genes. A similar criticism can be applied to this theory: this function 
is hardly specific of reasoning – such ability to decontextualize (or, more 
accurately, to take context into account in a finer grained fashion) is some-
times attributed to the frontal cortex generally and can be used to explain 
the behavior of rats for instance (Prescott, Redgrave, & Gurney, 1999).  
It would thus seem that all of these proposals fail to give an evolutio-
nary rationale for the specific properties of reasoning. This may stem from 
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the fact that they all see reasoning as a tool correcting the shortcomings of 
other cognitive mechanisms and enhancing individual cognition. The gen-
eral argument against this view can be articulated as follows: (i) The whole 
of cognitive activity (in most animals) or at least the vast majority of it (in 
humans) goes on without reasoning. (ii) There is no reason to expect that 
evolution has been able to achieve with reasoning a cognitive procedure 
that would be so efficient as to be able to correct for the mistakes of numer-
ous other mechanisms—especially given the numerous mistakes it can lead 
to, as will be detailed in the following (see also Mercier & Sperber, submit-
ted). (iii) Reasoning is costly. If we grant these points, then the advantages 
reasoning offers as a tool to enhance individual cognition are not clear. This 
argument is, admittedly, not a proof. However, it shows that we should not 
accept as obvious the classical story about the individual origin of reason-
ing. Ultimately, the argument will be won by the theory that fits better with 
the data we have on reasoning. What follows is an evolutionary story that 
could more plausibly have led to the evolution of reasoning mechanisms, 
and a short review of the data supporting it. 
3 The dangers of communication 
Communication is dangerous. You can be lied to, deceived, manipulated. 
These dangers are well known to biologists who study the evolution of 
communication. They point out that for communication to evolve it has to 
be mostly honest: if senders don’t benefit from it, they stop sending, and if 
receivers don’t benefit, they stop receiving (Krebs & Dawkins, 1984). 
Maintaining honesty is hard though because each individual sender would 
benefit more if she could manipulate receivers to her advantage. One way 
to maintain honesty is for communication to be costly: if you have to incur 
a cost in order to be able to communicate, and if only some individuals are 
able to incur this cost, then communicating reliably signals your ability to 
pay this cost (Zahavi & Zahavi, 1997).  
Human communication however is mostly ‘cheap talk’: speaking 
doesn’t cost us much in terms of energy for instance. Accordingly, they 
have evolved a suite of mechanisms to deal with this issue (Sperber et al., 
In press)  Such a solution to enforce honesty is for receivers to calibrate 
their trust appropriately and to stop responding to senders who have sent 
dishonest signals. This is called “skeptical responding” and some monkeys 
have been shown to make a smart use of this strategy (Cheney & Seyfarth, 
1990; Gouzoules, Gouzoules, & Miller, 1996). As we mentioned in the 
introduction, humans too make a wide use of this strategy: we calibrate our 
trust following criteria of competence and benevolence and react according-
ly to the information we are communicated. However, humans also use 
other strategies. Most importantly, they test the coherence of what they are 
told against what they already know. 
4 Coherence checking 
Maintaining a coherent behavior has been important at least since the appa-
rition of bilateral symmetry (Koopowitz & Keenan, 1982; Prescott, 2007). 
Several structures are important in this respect. Some deal with action se-
lection and making sure that the behavior remains coherent through time 
(most famously the basal ganglia, see Redgrave, Prescott, & Gurney, 1999). 
Others are thought to be in charge of detecting conflicts within the system 
(such as the anterior cingulate, Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 
2001). Some forms of cognitive dissonance, such as that found in other 
species, could be explained by the necessary presence of such regulatory 
mechanisms in any complex cognitive system (see Egan, Santos, & Bloom, 
2007).  
This sensitivity to dissonant information could be used as a tool to filter 
incoming information. If someone tells me something that clashes with my 
beliefs, then I can use this as ground for rejections, or at least further ex-
amination. If the mechanisms that deal with incoherent information can be 
used, they also have to be modified in order to fulfill this sifting function. 
First, the preferences for new versus old information must be reversed. 
Generally in case of conflict (such as between perception and memory) old 
information should be forgotten, or at least updated, in view of new infor-
mation. In the case of communication, it is more cautious to do the oppo-
site: if you think there is food in A and someone tells you there is none, you 
might want to stick with your initial belief. Moreover, such conflicts can be 
used to modify the trust we grant different speakers. Lowering the trust 
granted to a speaker who says things that are inconsistent with our beliefs is 
a form of punishment – it in part deprives her of the benefits of communica-
tion – and can therefore contribute to maintaining the honesty of communi-
cation. Humans seem to follow both of these rules. They have in intrinsic 
bias towards their own opinion compared with that of others (Krueger, 
2003). And when someone tells them things that are incoherent with what 
they think, they can call her a liar (DePaulo et al., 2003) with all that en-
sues, or at least drastically diminish the trust they grant her (Slovic, 1993; 
Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). 
5 Bypassing coherence checking: the evolution of argu-
mentation 
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Faced with such sophisticated receivers senders can try to become even 
more sophisticated and an arms race ensues. Receivers use coherence with 
their beliefs as a mean to evaluate communicated information. However 
they cannot check the coherence with all of their beliefs: they will only use 
the ones that are the most relevant at the time and given what has been 
communicated. For example a Frenchman (Paul) who is not a huge soccer 
fan hears that Brazil won the world cup in 1964. There is no clash between 
that and what is immediately brought to mind – it would be different if the 
year was 400 BCE or the team that of Laos – so he accepts this information. 
However, it is very likely that somewhere in his belief base are the two fol-
lowing beliefs: France won in 1998 and soccer world cups occur every four 
years. If he had taken these two beliefs into account, he would have been 
able to reject the communicated information. Now imagine that this person 
then repeats this information to someone who is more knowledgeable soc-
cerwise (Valérie). For her this information will immediately call to mind the 
fact that Brazil won in 1962, and in conjunction with the premise that world 
cups occur only every four years, lead her to reject the communicated in-
formation. Valérie could then try to convince Paul that Brazil could not 
have won in 1964. She could just say “that’s impossible because Brazil won 
in 1962”, but Paul – sharing the stereotype that guys are more into soccer – 
might not take Valérie’s word for it. She will have to find premises that 
Paul will accept and that will convince him that she’s right. The best might 
be to remind him that France won in 1998, and that since world cups occur 
every four year, there was no world cup in 1964. The question is: how can 
she do that? How can she find the relevant premises among the huge quan-
tity of soccer related information that any soccer fan possesses? We will 
argue that this asks for a specialized mechanism2 that looks for relevant 
premises – and that this is the primary function of reasoning.  
To understand that we need a specialized mechanism for this task, it 
must first be shown that other mechanisms that are already present cannot 
accomplish this function. What mechanisms could be useful in that context? 
First, individuals must be able to communicate effectively. They must be 
able to find the means so that others understand what they want to convey. 
However, this cannot be enough to find premises. Going back to Valérie, 
her aim is to communicate that “Brazil didn’t win in 1964”. Her communi-
cative abilities will allow her to find the right words so that she can be un-
derstood by Paul, but nothing else. These mechanisms deal with being un-
derstood, not being convincing. Another mechanism that could be used is 
                                                          
2 By specialized mechanism I mean ‘module’, but not so much as the word is often used in 
the cognitive sciences (following Fodor), but in the more general sense of a mechanism whose 
inner workings are mostly independent from other mechanisms. 
the ability to determine whether the other person is going to accept what we 
say. As we mentioned, people who say things that are not coherent with 
their audience’s beliefs tend to suffer from a decrease in trust (try urging 
people to vote for Le Pen at a socialist meeting). To protect themselves 
from this risk, individuals must be able to “think twice before saying some-
thing” or, more precisely, to filter out communications that would be inade-
quate. But this again cannot be sufficient. This mechanism could warn 
Valérie that she cannot bluntly say that “Brazil won in 1962” because she 
might not be believed and Paul could not only think that she knows nothing 
about soccer, but also that she is mildly annoying. But this mechanism will 
not tell her what the premises are that would allow her to persuade Paul: 
there are too many things that Paul would be willing to accept but that 
won’t do the trick as premises.  
Lastly, general phenomena of relevance and availability will play a role. 
When the topic is soccer, soccer related information will tend to be more 
easily available. However in this case too there is too much information 
available to pick up from. Moreover, in the normal course of cognition what 
is relevant is to draw new inferences, not to come back to why we think 
what we think. The facts that France won in 1998 and that world cups occur 
every four years are highly relevant as premises to the conclusion that Bra-
zil didn’t win in 1964, but they do not follow from it at all. All of these 
mechanisms can serve to restrict the range of beliefs that will be considered 
as potential premises: they must be communicable, acceptable by the other, 
and relevant to the general topic at hand. But these mechanisms cannot de-
termine what specific beliefs will be relevant as premises.  
Learning could have played an important role during the evolution of 
reasoning, because the problem of finding premises might not have been so 
stark for our ancestors. If we assume that their communicative system was 
more limited in content than ours, and given that only communicable be-
liefs can be taken as premises, it follows that the search space for premises 
might have been considerably smaller. In these conditions, it is possible that 
the mechanisms mentioned above might have allowed individuals to find 
appropriate premises. The receivers would be an important source of feed-
back: if the premises are appropriate, they will be convinced, if they are not, 
they won’t. This allows for an immediate feedback that has two nice prop-
erties. The first is that failing has a cost. When we use an inappropriate 
premise we will have laboured in vain (the other person will not accept the 
intended conclusion) and – more importantly – our reputation might suffer. 
This will happen because the conclusion is something that the receiver will 
think is incoherent with her beliefs – that’s why we were looking for a 
premise in the first place. The second is that this cost need not be very high. 
It makes sense that most persuasion attempts – especially at this stage – will 
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involve conclusions that are not strongly incoherent with the receiver’s be-
liefs, both because of the higher price for failure (the other might think of 
us as a fool or a crook) and because of the difficulty of finding convincing 
premises in this case. So if the persuasion attempt fails, given that the con-
clusion is not highly incoherent with the receiver’s belief, she will probably 
lower the trust she grants us only minimally. This is quite different from, 
say, a snake detector mechanism for which the feedback is less lenient, and 
allows for a more comfortable and extended learning phase. But even if the 
cost is low, it is still there, and it will favour individuals who learn faster. 
So we have both a possibility for the skill to be learned, and a selection 
pressure for this learning to be made easier – to be more ‘prewired’ so to 
speak. 
It may be worth belabouring a point that might seem to go against some 
ideas developed earlier by Sperber (2001, for instance). The claim made 
here is that reasoning evolved firstly in order to bypass the coherence 
checking mechanisms of other individuals – in other words, to persuade an 
audience. Earlier, it was its role in detecting deception attempts that was 
stressed – its filtering role as a mechanism of epistemic vigilance. So, what 
role was the more important during the evolution of reasoning? Two argu-
ments can be made to support the view that persuasion was primary. The 
first is that if no one is producing arguments, then there are no arguments to 
examine. The second is that at any given point of the evolution of commu-
nication, it has to be stable. This means that the receivers have to benefit 
from it overall. In order not to be too easily taken advantage of by senders, 
they should then tend to err on the side of cautiousness: they will be reject-
ing too much information rather than not enough. That puts pressure on 
senders to find ways to have more information accepted. This also means 
that new mechanisms of epistemic vigilance will necessarily allow receivers 
to accept more, not less, information. The contrary would mean that they 
were accepting too much information for their own good before, making 
communication unstable. This opposition is not necessarily of great import 
though: the mechanisms used to produce arguments and to evaluate them 
are profoundly similar. In both cases, propositions have to be evaluated in 
order to see if they are fit as premises for a given conclusion – either be-
cause a sender is looking for a premise to convey a conclusion, or because a 
receiver is trying to evaluate an argument. So even though I favour the idea 
that reasoning evolved first as a persuasion device, the fact is that everyone 
uses it both ways, and that given the overlap in functional requirements, this 
distinction between persuading and filtering should not play an important 
role. 
6 How do we recognize good premises? 
We have said that a mechanism that finds good premises is necessary to 
account for the way we argue. We have suggested that its evolution might 
have been easier among our ancestors and that a good feedback mechanism 
allowing for learning but also favouring some innateness was present. But 
this doesn’t tell us what the actual cues are that this mechanism can use in 
order to find good premises. For instance, being attacked by a predator or 
not is a good feedback mechanism for a predator detection mechanism. But 
for this mechanism to work, cues must exist that reliably differentiate a 
predator from a non predator (such as having both eyes facing us). Like-
wise, cues must exist that differentiate a good premise from a poor one. It is 
fair to say that we don’t know what these cues are (but see Mercier, submit-
ted, for a tentative answer). But it is important to point that this doesn’t 
mean that there is no answer. Psychologists are only beginning to under-
stand what cues are taken into account when we evaluate if someone would 
be a good friend or a good mate, if some food is edible, if an animal is dan-
gerous and, in the case of purely learnt skills, how experts in any given do-
main manage to accomplish their feats. We can use evaluating potential 
mates as an example. When we meet someone, a host of cues can be used in 
determining if that person would be a good mate. Most will only play a 
limited role, but some will be of paramount importance. Likewise, in the 
case of premises lots of different cues can be taken into account, some be-
ing more decisive than others. In this case however, establishing what these 
cues are is much harder because we are dealing with objects that we cannot 
directly observe or easily manipulate – namely representations. It should 
therefore come as no surprise that we still don’t know how we recognize 
good premises. 
Once this ability to find premises is available, it is possible to use it in 
order to evaluate other people’s arguments: in this case as well, people have 
to determine whether a given representation is a good premise for a given 
conclusion—the difference being that in this case, someone else has given 
them the premise and the conclusion. When we are confronted with a pre-
mise and a conclusion, we can use reasoning to determine if the premise is a 
good one. This ability that allows us to find good premises and to evaluate 
the strength of the link between a premise and a conclusion can properly be 
called reasoning. 
7 Consequences for individual reasoning and decision-
making 
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The first consequence of this view of reasoning is that we should observe 
some prevalent biases (see Mercier & Sperber, submitted, for an exhaustive 
empirical argument). When reasoning is used not in order to evaluate an 
argument but before making a decision or stating something, its function is 
not to help make a better decision (including statements), it is to find sup-
port for that decision, to justify it. This can have two broad types of conse-
quences. If, before reasoning, we are highly confident in the decision or the 
statement then reasoning will tend to bring only support for this decision, 
and it should bolster our confidence. If, on the other hand, our confidence is 
not very high then reasoning can influence our decision – not necessarily 
towards one that is better, but towards one that is easier to justify. In sup-
port of this, a quick review of the relevant literature will show (i) that con-
firmation and disconfirmation biases are extremely prevalent in reasoning, 
(ii) that reasoning doesn’t necessarily help make better decisions and (iii) 
that reasoning tends to make us choose options that are easier to justify.  
Confirmation bias consists in « seeking or interpreting of evidence in 
ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in 
hand » (Nickerson, 1998, p. 175). Disconfirmation bias is the other face of 
the same coin: it appears when we are overly critical of an opinion that 
doesn’t fit our views. As a result of these two biases people have a strong 
“myside bias”, meaning that they will find arguments for their side of an 
issue much more easily than for the other side. These three biases have been 
found ever and again, both in the laboratory and in natural settings, and 
there is no space here to review these works (Edwards & Smith, 1996; 
Nickerson, 1998; Stanovich & West, 2007). Two points can be emphasized 
though. The first is that these biases are not only very prevalent, but are also 
very robust. Instructions to reason objectively usually have no or very li-
mited effect (see for instance Frantz & Janoff-Bulman, 2000; Lord, Lepper, 
& Preston, 1984; Poletiek, 1996). These biases do not disappear with higher 
education or even with scientific training (Mahoney & DeMonbreun, 1977; 
Toplak & Stanovich, 2003). They are found in people with high ‘cognitive 
ability’ and an open mind (Stanovich & West, 2007). The prevalence and 
robustness of these biases render them hard to explain in terms of cognitive 
limitations or random wanderings of the reason. These results fit much bet-
ter with the view of reasoning as an argumentative device that seeks to find 
support for our views: in this case, these biases are built in the way reason-
ing works, and they are therefore expected to be prevalent and robust. 
Another point worth stressing is that experiments that have managed to 
attenuate or get rid of these biases did so by changing the participants’ per-
ception of the belief that is being reasoned upon. For instance, participants 
tend to be lenient with studies that support their views, and overly critical of 
studies that contradict them (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Edwards & Smith, 1996; 
Lord, Ross, & Lepper, 1979). Instructions to be objective have no or li-
mited effect, but if the participants are led to believe that the conclusions 
were in fact the opposite of what they were thought to be, then they become 
perfectly able to criticize the study they had considered with leniency be-
fore, and vice versa (Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984). Likewise, participants 
who seemed to be unable to use a falsifying strategy became quite apt at 
doing so when the hypothesis to be tested came not from them but from 
someone else (Cowley & Byrne, 2005).  
Finally it seems that these biases have the expected effect on the beliefs 
we reason upon: they bolster our confidence. The confirmation bias is 
probably one of the explanations for overconfidence (Koriat, Lichtenstein, 
& Fischhoff, 1980, see also Wilson & LaFleur, 1995). When we are confi-
dent in our views, expecting to have to justify them tends to strengthen 
them (Lambert, Cronen, Chasteen, & Lickel, 1996). More generally, when 
we have to defend a decision after having made it, we tend to be more con-
fident that it was a good one (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). So it would seem 
that when we feel strongly about something, reasoning is not going to 
change our view – quite the contrary.  
It is obvious however that in some cases reasoning will change our 
views on an issue, or towards a decision to be made. This should happen 
mostly when we are not highly confident in an option to start with, when 
we have no strong intuitions. When this happens however, there is still no 
guarantee that reasoning will help us make better decisions or have epistem-
ically superior beliefs. In fact there even is a flurry of evidence showing 
that for a wide range of cases, reasoning will actually be a hindrance. When 
they have to think about reasons for their choices, people pick posters that 
will satisfy them less (Wilson et al., 1993), jellies that are judged to be less 
good by experts (Wilson & Schooler, 1991), apartments, roommates, cars 
and furniture that are less optimal (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis, Bos, 
Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006), and they are less good at predicting the 
outcome of basketball games (Halberstadt & Levine, 1999).  
Similar effects have been observed far from social psychology. In the 
field of implicit learning, it has been shown that for some tasks (in this case 
learning an artificial grammar), trying to think explicitly about the learning 
process disturbs it (Reber, 1993). Likewise, the oft cited failures to take 
base rates into account or to deal with risk and uncertainty (see Kahneman, 
Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) seem to be a result of an over reliance on explicit 
processes: when the data acquisition is implicit or when the questions are 
asked implicitly (or both), performance improves dramatically – reaching 
optimality in some contexts (Maloney, Trommershäuser, & Landy, 2007; 
Spellman, 1993). So the standard assumption of most economists and po-
litical scientists – but also of most psychologists of reasoning –  that reason-
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ing leads to better choices clearly does not hold across the board. This 
could be a simple disruptive effect of reasoning – it could be for instance 
that reasoning uses resources and renders them unavailable for other proc-
esses. This may be the case in some instances, but there is evidence that 
reasoning creates a much more systematic bias, a bias towards choice that 
are easy to justify.   
The idea that our choices are guided by the reasons we can provide for 
them has created a successful research program around “reason-based 
choice” (Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993). Based on ideas from the heu-
ristic and biases school (see for instance Slovic, 1975), it was first clearly 
articulated by Simonson. In a 1989 paper, he showed that the attraction 
effect (the fact that the introduction of an inferior alternative can modify a 
choice) and the compromise effect (the fact that a middle option in a set 
will tend to be favoured) can both be adequately explained by the use of 
reasons. Consistent with this interpretation, the choices based on reason 
were more common when participants had to justify their answers, and the 
justifications offered for these choices were more elaborate. Since then the 
“reason-based choice” framework has been used to explain many failures to 
follow normative guidelines (see for instance Arkes & Ayton, 1999, Shafir, 
Simonson, & Tversky, 1993). Basing their choices on reason seem to often 
lead people away from the normative answer, but it should allow them to be 
more persuasive if they had to convince someone that they made the right 
decision. Direct evidence that this is the case is hard to come by, but there is 
some indirect evidence. For instance, because people from different cul-
tures will vary in the reasons they will use, having to justify their choices 
can make people from different cultures make different choices, even if 
their choices were similar when they didn’t have to justify them (Briley, 
Morris, & Simonson, 2000). It seems very plausible that because the justifi-
cations fit so well with the culture, they would render the choice more con-
vincing – in the same culture obviously. Also, in some cases at least, the 
choices that are dictated by reasons are dominant in group settings. This is 
the case of sunk costs for example: groups tend to commit the fallacy even 
more than individuals (Whyte, 1993).  
So reasoning, when done individually, doesn’t necessarily yield very 
impressive results. Does that mean that we should go with our guts all the 
time? Of course not, for at least two reasons. The first is that in some cases 
our guts can be terribly wrong. When we are confronted with a problem 
that we did not evolve to solve, and that we did not acquire an expertise 
about, then there is no reason our intuitions should be particularly good. 
Moreover, when the (even imaginary) audience in front of which we expect 
to justify ourselves is fair-minded and knowledgeable, then reasoning can 
indeed be a good idea. It has been shown that expecting to be accountable 
to such an audience often improves performances (Lerner & Tetlock, 
1999). We will now turn to another, more natural, way to improve the out-
come of reasoning. 
8 Consequences for group reasoning and decision making 
The results reviewed above could lead us to think that reasoning is much 
less efficient than it actually is. This is because in these experiments reason-
ing was used in the confine of participants’ minds, and if the evolutionary 
story we told is right, then this is not the normal context for reasoning to 
occur. If reasoning is a tool for persuasion and evaluation, it should be used 
when we are arguing with someone else. To see what effects these contexts 
have on reasoning, we will turn to the analysis of group reasoning and deci-
sion making.  
When used individually reasoning is mostly a tool of (anticipated) per-
suasion. In group contexts however the evaluative function of reasoning 
will be used too. This allows people to differentially accept good and bad 
arguments, to filter incoming information. And they are able to do that: in 
the right conditions (when they are involved in the task, not distracted, etc.) 
people are more influenced by strong than by weak arguments (Petty & 
Wegener, 1998). As a result, groups too should function as filters. Assum-
ing each member has an opinion before the discussion starts, then their rea-
soning should be oriented towards trying to convince others that they are 
right. Everyone hears out the arguments of the others and gives more 
weight to good arguments. The most interesting tasks in this respect are 
those that fulfil the following conditions: (i) they have a demonstrably cor-
rect answer that (ii) can be understood by all members and (iii) that is ar-
rived at by at least one member (Laughlin & Ellis, 1986). This is true of 
some mathematical problems (Laughlin & Ellis, 1986; Stasson, Kameda, 
Parks, Zimmerman, & Davis, 1991), logical problems (Maciejovsky & 
Budescu, 2007; Moshman & Geil, 1998), ‘eureka’ problems (Laughlin, 
Kerr, Davis, Halff, & Marciniak, 1975), or problems drawn from the mas-
termind game (Bonner, Baumann, & Dalal, 2002). For these tasks, the so-
cial decision schemes (Davis, 1973), ‘truth wins’ applies: if at least one 
participant has the good answer, this answer will be that of the group. This 
means that groups will then perform as their best member, leading to an 
increase in performance that can be dramatic (see Moshman & Geil, 1998 
for instance).  
It should be stressed that the phenomenon at play here is not a simple 
transmission of information. It’s not as if one individual was recognized, 
for some reason, as being the smartest or the more competent and that the 
others listen to her. For group processes to increase performances, conflict 
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is crucial (see Schulz-Hardt, Brodbeck, Mojzisch, Kerschreiter, & Frey, 
2006 and numerous references within). Moreover, the filtering function of 
groups can discriminate in a fine grained fashion and pick up only the good 
pieces in an individual’s opinion. Take the Wason selection task for in-
stance. It is a classical reasoning problem for which the truth wins scheme 
applies (Moshman & Geil, 1998). But it has been observed that a group can 
get to the correct answer even if no individual member had it to start with. 
It is enough that the pieces of the correct answer are distributed – with their 
correct justification – among them. In these cases, groups outperform their 
best individual members. This is known as the “assembly bonus effect” in 
social psychology (Laughlin, Bonner, & Miner, 2002; Michaelsen, Watson, 
& Black, 1989; Sniezek & Henry, 1989; Tindale & Sheffey, 2002) and as 
the “two wrongs make a right” in developmental psychology (Glachan & 
Light, 1982; Schwarz, Neuman, & Biezuner, 2000).  
So people are able to choose positions that are better supported than 
their alternatives. The problem is that sometimes well supported positions 
are wrong. This is the case of the representativeness heuristic and the con-
junction error. In the classic demonstration of the use of this heuristic a 
description of a person very representative of a feminist is given, and par-
ticipants are asked to rank the chances that she is, among other things, a 
bank teller, and both a feminist and a bank teller (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1983). Given that ‘feminist bank teller’ fits more with the description, par-
ticipants tend to ascribe to it a higher probability than to ‘bank teller’, thus 
violating the axiom of probability theory stating that P(A) ≥ P(A&B) and 
committing the conjunction fallacy. The representativeness heuristic can 
easily yield what could be considered as a good reason for the answer: 
“look as the description, she’s very likely to be a feminist”, and it has been 
observed that even when only one group member supports her answer with 
this heuristic, she will tend to win the group’s opinion3. When a wrong but 
well supported answer is given by a majority of the members, this can 
strengthen the bias – much in the same way as when we are confident in our 
own answer, reasoning upon it will tend to bolster our views. This seems to 
apply for sunk costs (Whyte, 1993). Given that most people commit the 
fallacy, and that they seem to be doing so because of the reliance on a rea-
                                                          
3 That is, provided that the other participants propose other non normative answers. The case 
in which one of the participants has the normatively correct answer and the good explanation 
for it hasn’t been tested, but given the results mentioned above and the fact that it is quite easy 
to demonstrate the correct answer, she should win the argument.  
son, it is only to be expected that groups fare even less well than individu-
als4. 
9 How to make the best of a biased world 
A minimal way to look at the way groups work is to consider them as ag-
gregating, levelling mechanisms. Each member comes up with an answer, 
and provided that the distribution is more or less random around the correct 
choice, a simple rule like majority wins will yield good results in a broad 
range of cases (Hastie & Kameda, 2005). In this light, groups are a very 
simple debiasing mechanism: we are all biased towards our views, and, 
through averaging, groups compensate for these biases. So we might think 
that groups are an effective way to use reasoning because it gets rid of the 
biases that plague it. But doing so cancels all the added value reasoning can 
bring: group members might as well give their answers right away without 
any reasoning and justification and let the group average. Another way to 
look at groups is to see them as tools that allow us to make the best of rea-
soning.  
To understand this we can compare the case of an unbiased reasoning 
ability with what happens in groups. What would an unbiased reasoning 
ability look like? If such a mechanism had to evaluate a belief for instance, 
it would alternatively find arguments for and against it and impartially 
weight these arguments. Such a mechanism would not be foolproof – we 
don’t have infinite knowledge or infinite time and energy available – but it 
should generally better the epistemic status of the belief without overly tip-
ping the scale in favour of beliefs we had a soft spot for to start with. In a 
way, this is exactly what groups can do – and they can even do it better. 
Imagine two people reasoning independently over a choice between two 
options. The first person favours option A, and will think of arguments con-
firming this view, thus inadequately bolstering her belief that she is right. 
Same for the other person and option B. But if these two people argue to-
gether, what should happen is similar to what would have happened if any 
one of them had used ‘unbiased’ reasoning. They are going to suggest ar-
guments that will then be compared on the basis of their relative strength. 
But in this case, instead of having to find and evaluate arguments for both 
sides, each of them only has to find arguments for her side and evaluate 
argument for the other, thus cutting back the effort by a factor two. In that 
case, the very biases that are usually seen as plaguing reasoning become an 
                                                          
4 Again, this is assuming that no participant is aware of the normative answer and the nor-
mative explanation. When this is the case, reasoning decreases the sunk costs fallacy 
(Simonson & Nye, 1992). 
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efficient way to divide labour. It is thus not surprising that some of the 
more efficient forecasting methods require people to make a forecast, jus-
tify their decisions and share this with the other forecasters in an anony-
mous way. The same operation is then repeated over several rounds. The 
Delphi method for instance (a variation on this theme) has been shown to 
be extremely effective, having advantages over other group settings, statis-
tical models and prediction markets (Rowe & Wright, 1999)5. On the other 
hand, the more conditions depart from a somewhat idealized discussion 
context—for instance by large asymmetries in power, the introduction of a 
larger audience that participants may try to target instead of aiming at their 
interlocutor, or forced debate between people who agree on the issue at 
hand—the more likely it is that argumentation is going to lead people 
astray. 
10 Conclusion 
This paper opened with a general argument against the view that rea-
soning is mostly a prop of individual cognition. An alternative story, in 
which reasoning evolved as an argumentative device, was suggested. Even 
if one were to buy this argument, it would then be tempting to think that 
reasoning could have been co-opted for more general purposes: reasoning 
would have evolved first for argumentation but, being useful for so many 
other things, its feature would have changed to accommodate these new 
functions. Then the biases that were mentioned earlier – the confirmation 
bias and the disconfirmation bias – wouldn’t have a reason to exist anymore 
– they would just be a hindrance. It is not obvious that an a priori argument 
can be made against the view that reasoning could have been co-opted for 
many different purposes besides argumentation. However, it seems that the 
features of reasoning that we can observe now fit much better the simple 
story that argumentation has always been the main driver of its evolution. 
People who think that reasoning subsequently evolved to fulfill a whole 
array of functions should now show either that the biases and other features 
of reasoning that fit only with the argumentative function are actually not 
present – and that would mean reinterpreting a considerable body of re-
search, only hinted at here – or that these features acted as constraints that 
could not be overwhelmed by selection pressures.  
                                                          
5 The benefits of information pooling have been well demonstrated in other animals, who 
seem to be using a form of the Condorcet Jury Theorem (Conradt & Roper, 2003, 2005; List, 
2004). However, debate has features that render it quite different from other forms of opinion 
aggregation (such as voting – as in the CJT – or bargaining). There is no space here to discuss 
these issues further, but see Elster (1998) for an opinion that would be closed to the one that 
would be defended here. 
 
As a final word, I cannot help but to mention how sad reasoning would be  
if it was a purely individual endeavour: “for man in the preservation of his 
being and the enjoyment of the rational life there is nothing more useful 
than his fellow-man who is led by reason.” (Spinoza, 1677, Ethics IV app. 
IX).  
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